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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF AN EARLY CAREER RECESSION
ON SCHOOLING AND LIFETIME WELFARE
Naijia Guo
Kenneth Wolpin
This paper evaluates the long-term welfare consequences from experiencing a recession as
youths, taking into account the impact on schooling, future job mobility, human capital ac-
cumulation, labor supply and wages. The paper also explores the mechanisms that account
for lifetime wage changes by decomposing those changes into different channels: changes
from schooling, from work experience, and from job mobility. To achieve these goals, this
paper develops and estimates a search equilibrium model with heterogenous agents and
aggregate shocks. The model is an extension of a directed search model, the Block Re-
cursive Equilibrium framework of Menzio and Shi (2010a), which remains tractable when
it is solved outside of the steady state. The counterfactual analysis shows that experienc-
ing the 1981-1982 recession at age 16-22 causes a 2.2% to 3.0% loss in lifetime welfare.
Endogenizing schooling decision avoids overestimation of the welfare loss. The wage de-
composition shows that the loss from job mobility explains the majority of the wage loss
during the recession, and the loss in experience and tenure persists long after the recession.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent US recession has brought renewed interest in the relationship between individual
careers and the business cycle. The impact of the business cycle on early careers is of
particular concern because young workers are most vulnerable to economic shocks. During
the recession, the youth unemployment rate (age 16-25) rose to a peak of 20.1% in 2010,
compared to 11.5% in 2007, the year before the recession started. During the same period,
young workers (age 16-25) faced an 8% decrease in wages relative to 2007.1 In sum,
individuals entering the labor market in a recession suffer from unemployment or work
in a lower-paid job. More importantly, the occurrence of a recession during the period
when youths are transiting from school to work affects human capital accumulation and
job mobility decisions, therefore, may have a potential long-term impact on lifetime wages
and employment opportunities. As suggested in many previous literature, students who
enter the labor market in a recession suffer from persistent wage loss that can last for 5 to
20 years.2
Although youth unemployment increased during the recent recession, there was also an
1Source: Current Population Survey.
2 Adda et al. (2013), Oreopoulos et al. (2012), Kahn (2010), Oyer (2008), Oyer (2006), etc.
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increase in the school enrollment rate, from 28.3% in 2007 to 32.6% in 2010.3 Because
the opportunity cost of schooling decreases during a recession, postponing entry into the
laborforce by remaining in school may be an optimal response. The resulting increase
in schooling may increase future wages and employment and, thus, partially offset the
potential long-term negative impact of the recession. Moreover, there can be a change in
the workforce composition across graduation cohorts if agents with different characteristics
make different schooling decisions over the business cycle. To fully account for the lifetime
consequences of a recession that occurs during the school-to-work transition period, it is
necessary to conduct a welfare analysis that takes into account the impact on schooling, job
mobility, human capital accumulation, labor supply and wages.
This paper evaluates the long-term welfare and labor market consequences of experi-
encing a recession as a youth. I also identify different channels that account for lifetime
wage changes: schooling, work experience, and job mobility. To achieve these goals, I
develop and estimate a search equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and aggregate
shocks. The model is an extension of the Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) model of
a directed search model proposed by Menzio and Shi (2010a). Labor markets are divided
into submarkets, which are defined by a piece-rate wage contract, as well as by the worker’s
characteristics (skill and age) at the time the firm and the worker meet. The contractual en-
vironment is such that the firm commits to a wage that remains a constant proportion of
output throughout the duration of the employment relationship. On the labor supply side
of the market, individuals make schooling, work and search decisions, including on-the-
job search. Given their characteristics, individuals direct their search to a wage contract
that maximizes expected utility. On the labor demand side of the market, firms decide
whether to open a vacancy and in which submarket to open the vacancy. Workers and
3Source: Current Population Survey. School enrollment rate is the proportion of people between age 16
to 25 who are full-time students. Although there was an upward trend in school enrollment rate during this
period, the increase was 2% higher than the trend.
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firms are brought into contact according to a constant returns to scale matching function.
In equilibrium, the distribution of wages across workers and the level of unemployment are
determined by the free entry condition of firms and workers in the search market.
In the model, individuals are heterogeneous in their skill, utility value of leisure, utility
value of schooling and the productivity shocks they experience during their lifetime. Skill
is determined by an individual’s schooling, experience, job tenure and initial human capital
endowment. Upon meeting, a productivity level of the match is determined, and the match
productivity stays constant throughout the lifetime of the match. A worker’s output is
determined by the current level of aggregate productivity, by the match productivity at the
time the worker and the firm met and by the worker’s skill. The model incorporates two
types of driving forces of the business cycle, shocks to aggregate productivity and shocks
to match productivity.4
Menzio and Shi (2010a) shows that solving a BRE model with heterogeneous agents
and productivity shocks is equivalent to solving a representative agent model. This allows
me to avoid the analytical and computational difficulties involved in solving equilibrium
labor market models with random search.5 This is because in the BRE, agents’ value func-
tions and policy functions only depend on productivity shocks, and not on the endogenous
distribution of workers across employment states. Hence, the model remains tractable when
it is solved outside of the steady state where the distribution of workers across different
wages and employment states is allowed to change over the business cycle.
I modify the framework of Menzio and Shi (2010a) to accommodate the research ques-
tions raised in this paper. First, I endogenize the schooling decision over the business cycle.
In my model, an individual is allowed to decide when to enter the labor market, and whether
4Eyigungor (2010) shows that the addition of match productivity shocks solves the problem that shocks to
aggregate productivity can account for only a small portion of the volatility in unemployment and vacancies.
5Robin (2011) proposes a random search model with heterogeneous agents and aggregate productivity
shocks and shows that the model remains tractable when it is solved outside of the steady state. However, the
tractability depends on several assumptions, including exogenous matching rate and full monopsony power
of employers.
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and when to return to school. Second, I enrich agent heterogeneity by allowing agents to
differ in characteristics that are potentially unobserved to researchers. For example, agents
can have different initial human capital endowments, as well as different preferences for
leisure and schooling. Third, I assume piece-rate wage contracts where workers are always
paid a fixed fraction of their current period output while Menzio and Shi (2010a) use fixed-
wage contracts and dynamic contracts. Using piece-rate contracts allows me to decompose
the wage change into the gain from human capital accumulation, which is reflected by the
change in the output, and the gain from on-the-job search, which is reflected by the change
in the share given to workers.
I solve the equilibrium outside of the steady state where wages and the unemployment
rate are endogenously determined over the business cycle. I estimate the model using sim-
ulated method of moments. Sample statistics used in the estimation are from the Monthly
Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1982 to 2012 and the 1979 and 1997 National Lon-
gitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY). The CPS is primarily a cross-sectional data set that
provides information on employment, income, school enrollment and demographics. The
NLSY79 and NLSY97 are longitudinal data sets that provide supplementary information
on experience and tenure. The sample is restricted to be white male individuals age 16 -
65.6 The model is fit to the distributions of employment, income and labor market transi-
tions over the life cycle and over the business cycle.
To quantify the lifetime impact of a recession, I perform a counterfactual analysis that
evaluates the lifetime welfare loss from experiencing the 1981-1983 recession as a youth.
On average, there was a 3 percentage point (ppt) decrease in the employment rate and a
1.5% wage drop during the recession period. According to the estimation, it was caused by
a 0.5% decrease in aggregate productivity and a 10% decrease in match productivity. For
cohorts who turned age 16-22 in 1980, the 1980s recession leads to a 2.2% to 3.0% loss in
6The sample is restricted to the white male sample because their labor supply decisions are least sensitive
to external factors such as childbearing or discrimination.
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lifetime welfare (in consumption dollars). Students with higher schooling level suffer from
a larger welfare loss. This is because on average, there is a 0.25 year increase in schooling
due to the recession and the increase is larger for the less educated. There is an initial 20%
- 35% wage drop during the recession, which lasts for 5 - 10 years after the recession. The
loss in the employment rate recovers right after the recession.
I also find that without endogenizing schooling decisions overestimates the welfare
loss. Firstly, an early career recession leads an increase in schooling, which increases future
wages by 4% and increases employment rate by 1 ppt. Therefore, acquiring more schooling
can partially offset the negative impact from an early career recession. In addition, there
is a change in the workforce composition with respect to initial human capital endowment.
Those with higher initial human capital endowment are more likely to stay at school rather
than enter the labor market in a recession. Hence, the wage loss in a recession is partly due
to the fact that individuals with lower human capital are more likely to work in a recession.
The mechanisms underlying the life cycle wage changes are explored through a de-
composition analysis. Individuals face a tradeoff when a recession occurs at their school-
to-work transition period. On the one hand, they can start with a lower-paid job and catch
up later through on-the-job search. However, it may take time to climb up the wage lad-
der due to search frictions. On the other hand, they can go to school or stay at home and
wait until the recession is over. In either case, at the later time of labor market entry, they
will lose experience and tenure. The wage decomposition shows that during the recession,
44.0% of the wage loss comes from job shopping, 40.7% comes from the decline in produc-
tivity, 19.1% comes from the loss in experience and tenure, and the increase in schooling
offsets the wage loss by 3.8%. After the recession, the loss from job shopping recovers in
3 years. In contrast, the loss in experience and tenure recovers in 14 years. At the same
time, the increase in schooling not only improves output, but also results in an increase in
the share of output that workers can get from firms, which further increases wages.
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This paper is related to several strands of literature, the literature on the long-term im-
pact of early events on wages and employment, the literature on the effect of the business
cycle on schooling and the literature on directed search. The first branch of literature ex-
plores whether a bad event occurring at an early career stage can cause a persistent loss in
wages or employment opportunities, what is referred to as the “scarring effect”. Ellwood
(1982) was the first to examine the scarring effect from early unemployment and found per-
sistent negative effects on wages, but no evidence on recurrent unemployment. His results
have been confirmed by other follow-up studies in the US (Ruhm (1991), Jacobson et al.
(1993), Stevens (1997), Davis and von Wachter (2011)). European studies (Franz et al.
(1997), Gregg (2001), Gregg and Tominey (2005), von Wachter and Bender (2006), Skans
(2010)) have found scarring effects from early unemployment on both wages and future
unemployment in Britain, German and Sweden. At the same time, economists find that a
recession occurring at labor market entry can also cause a long-term wage loss (Bowlus
and Liu (2003), Raaum and Røed (2006), Oyer (2006), Oyer (2008), Genda et al. (2010),
Oreopoulos et al. (2012)). For example, Kahn (2010) looks at American college graduates
who entered the job market prior, during and after the 1980’s recession and observes that a
1% increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation leads to an initial wage loss
of 7% that recovers in 15 years. The most closely related paper is Adda et al. (2013) that
analyzes how careers are affected by economic downturns for skilled and unskilled work-
ers in Germany. They estimate a dynamic partial equilibrium model of vocational training
choice, labor supply, and wage progression and find that exposure to an economic shock
early in a worker’s career leads to wage reductions that persist for 5 to 10 years. My paper
contributes to this literature by developing and estimating a general equilibrium model to
investigate and quantify the channels of the lifetime welfare loss of a recession that occurs
at potential labor market entry. My paper also suggests that without endogenizing people’s
schooling decision during a recession, previous results overestimate the scarring effect.
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This paper is also related to the literature that studies the cyclical pattern of schooling.
Dellas and Koubi (2003) examine the cyclicality in school enrollment rates of various age
groups in the US from 1950 to 1990. Betts and McFarland (1995) examine the impact of
the business cycle on enrollments at individual community colleges between the late 1960s
and the mid-1980s. They find that the overall pattern is countercyclical. This paper links
the impact of the business cycle on schooling with the impact of schooling on lifetime
wages and employment. In addition, I show that schooling decisions change the workforce
composition with respect to initial human capital endowment during a recession.
Lastly, the theoretical part of my paper is related to the literature on search models.
Robin (2011) proposes a random search model with heterogeneous agents and aggregate
productivity shocks and shows that the model remains tractable when it is solved outside
of the steady state. However, the tractability depends on several assumptions: exogenous
matching rates, full monopsony power of firms and no human capital accumulation. In
contrast, the BRE model allows me to endogenize matching rates, incorporate learning by
doing and get rid of the monopsony assumption. In Menzio and Shi (2010a), they formally
prove existence and uniqueness of a BRE under various specifications of workers’ pref-
erences and contractual environments, including dynamic contracts and fixed-wage con-
tracts. In Menzio and Shi (2011), they apply the BRE model to business cycle data and find
that productivity shocks generate procyclical fluctuations in the rate at which unemployed
workers become employed and countercyclical fluctuations in the rate at which employed
workers become unemployed. In Menzio et al. (2012), they develop a life cycle BRE model
of the labor market and show that their model correctly predicts the pattern of labor mar-
ket transitions for workers of different ages. This paper extends their BRE framework by
endogenizing schooling decisions, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in agents, and
proposing a different type of wage contract that facilitates the wage decomposition analy-
sis. This is also the first paper that estimates a directed search model and shows that the
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BRE framework is able to fit the employment, wage and labor market transitions over the
life cycle as well as over the business cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 constructs and solves the model.
Chapter 3 describes the data. Chapter 4 discusses the identification. Chapter 5 explains the
estimation strategy. Chapter 6 shows the estimation results and the model fit. Chapter 7
presents results from counterfactual experiments. Chapter 8 concludes.
8
Chapter 2
Model
This is a life-cycle model of the labor market with heterogeneous agents and aggregate
shocks. The model is an extension of a directed search model of Menzio and Shi (2010a).
With directed search, I am able to focus on the Block Recursive Equilibrium where agents’
value functions and policy functions depend on the labor market conditions only via pro-
ductivity shocks, and not on the endogenous distribution of workers across employment
states. Therefore, the model can be solved outside of the steady state where level of unem-
ployment and distribution of wages are allowed to change over time. This property allows
me to solve a BRE model with heterogeneous agents and productivity shocks as easily as
solving a representative agent model and to avoid the analytical and computational diffi-
culties involved in solving equilibrium labor market models with random search.
2.1 Agents and Markets
Labor markets are divided into submarkets, which are defined by a wage contract, as well
as by the worker’s characteristics (skill s and age a) at the time the firm and the worker
meet. The contractual environment is such that the firm commits to a wage that remains a
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constant proportion µ of output throughout the duration of the employment relationship. In
submarket (s, a, µ), firms offer contracts µ to applicants of characteristics (s, a) and firms
offer unattractive contracts to applicants of characteristics /∈ (s, a).1
The economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous firms with positive mea-
sure. Firms are risk-neutral and maximize the expected sum of profits with discount factor
β. Firms choose whether to post a vacancy and in which submarket to post the vacancy.
Each firm can only open one vacancy and pays a fixed cost for opening one vacancy. As
each job consists of a single firm-worker pair, currently matched firms do not post new
vacancies.
The economy is also populated byA overlapping generations of agents. In every period,
a new generation of agents is born into the economy and lives for A periods. Agents
are risk-neutral and maximize the expected sum of periodical consumption discounted at
β. Individuals are born with different initial endowments, including their human capital
α0, preference for schooling bs, and preference for leisure bu. These initial endowments
are different by type k, common knowledge for individuals and firms, but unobserved to
researchers.
Individuals have three mutually exclusive status: staying at school, employed, and un-
employed.2 Each period, individuals make schooling, work and search decisions, including
on-the-job search. When searching, individuals direct their search to a submarket that cor-
responds with their skill and age by choosing a µ that maximizes their expected utility. A
higher µ will result in a higher wage if matched, but a lower offer arrival rate. The worker’s
characteristics determine whether the worker will seek µ that offer him lower wages but
are easier to find or µ that offer more generous wages but are harder to find.
Skill for individual i at age a is a vector of schooling, h, general experience, X , firm-
1Menzio and Shi (2010b) show that firms always find it optimal to attract exclusively one type of worker
to each submarket.
2Here I do not distinguish between unemployed workers and individuals out of the labor force but not in
school because I focus on white-male in the empirical analysis.
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specific experience (tenure), R, and initial human capital endowment, α0:
sia = (h
i
a, X
i
a, R
i
a, α
i
0)
Each match of a firm-worker pair embodies a productivity level z0, determined at the
time of its creation, and the embodied productivity of the match stays constant throughout
the lifetime of the match. Each worker’s output is yz0φ(s), determined by the current
aggregate productivity shock, y, the match productivity when the worker and the firm met,
z0, and worker production φ(s). Production function φ(s) is a function of worker skill:
φ(sia) ≡ exp (αi0 + α1hia + α2X ia + α3Ria)
Worker’s wage w = µ0yz0φ(s), where µ0 is the share of output given to the worker
determined at the time the worker and the firm met. Wage of an individual i of age a at
time t can be written as:
logwia,t = log µ
i
0,a + log yt + logz
i
0,a + α
i
0 + α1h
i
a + α2X
i
a + α3R
i
a
2.2 Environment
There are two driving forces of the business cycle: shocks to aggregate productivity, y,
and shocks to match-specific productivity, z. Match productivity shocks only affect the
values of new matches, not existing ones.3 Thus, match productivity shocks have a larger
impact of vacancy postings (and thus on the unemployment rate), compared to its impact
on average productivity. Eyigungor (2010) shows that the addition of match productivity
shocks solves the problem that shocks to aggregate productivity can account for only a
3This is a plausible representation because investment opportunities available at the time of creation of a
match may affect the technology of the match permanently (Eyigungor (2010)).
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small portion of the volatilities in unemployment and vacancies.
Time is discrete and continues forever. A period is three months. At the beginning of
each period, the aggregate state of the economy can be summarized byψ = (y, z, n, u, e, γ).
y is the current aggregate productivity shock and z is the current match productivity shock.
n(a) denotes the measure of students at age a. u(s, a) denotes the measure of workers with
(s, a) who are in the labor market but are not employed. e(µ, s, a, z0) denotes the measure
of employed workers in submarket (s, a, µ) with match productivity z0. γ denotes the the
measure of newly born workers. Although there are many elements in the state of economy
ψ, I will show in Appendix Chapter A that the value functions and policy functions depend
only on productivity shocks y and z, and not on other state variables in ψ that characterize
the distribution of workers across employment states.
Every period is divided into five stages: entry-and-exit, separation, search, matching
and production. In the first stage, nature draws a productivity shock y and a match produc-
tivity shock z from a distribution Γ(y, z|y˜, z˜), where y˜ and z˜ are aggregate shocks in the
last period. Individuals make schooling decisions: students decide whether to leave school
and enter the labor market while employed and unemployed workers decide whether to
return to school. At the same time, any workers who are older than A must leave the labor
market. Any students who are older than the maximum schooling age A˜ must enter the
labor market.
At the separation stage, an employed worker has probability d ∈ {δh, 1} of becoming
unemployed. There are two types of separations, endogenous separation and exogenous
separation. If the value of staying at home is greater than the value of being employed, the
worker will choose d = 1, which is endogenous separation. Otherwise, workers will have
an exogenous separation rate δh ∈ [0, 1], which can vary by schooling level h.
At the search stage, due to time constraints and other costs, agents may not search in
every period. Therefore, each agent gets an exogenous probability to search in every period.
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Search probabilities depend on employment status, schooling level and age. In particular, a
student has the opportunity to search with probability λnh ∈ (0, 1]. An unemployed worker
of age a has the opportunity to search with probability λuh,a ∈ (0, 1]. If a worker is employed
at the beginning of the separation stage and has not lost his job, he has the opportunity to
search with probability λeh,a ∈ (0, 1]. If the worker lost his job during the separation stage,
he cannot search in the current period. Whenever a worker has the opportunity to search,
given his characteristics (s, a), individuals direct their search to a wage contract µ that
maximizes expected utility. Also, during the search stage, a firm chooses whether to open
a vacancy and in which submarket (s, a, µ) to open the vacancy. The cost of maintaining a
vacancy for one period is κ > 0.
At the matching stage, the vacancies and the workers who are searching in the same
submarket come together through a frictional matching process. In submarket (µ, s, a), the
ratio of firms searching for workers to workers searching for firms is θa(µ, s, ψ), where ψ is
a summary of the state of the economy. Assuming constant returns to scale for the match-
ing function, the probability that a worker searching in submarket (µ, s, a) meets a vacancy
is p(θa(µ, s, ψ)), where p is a twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave function. Similarly, a vacancy-searching firm in submarket (µ, s, a) meets a worker
with probability q(θa(x, s, ψ)), where q is a twice-differentiable, strictly decreasing, con-
vex function such that q(θ) = p(θ)/θ. When a firm and a worker meet in a submarket
(µ, s, a), the match-specific productivity is determined and remains fixed for the lifetime
of the match. If the individual does not get an offer, he returns to his previous employment
position. Students who choose to stay in school at the first stage and don’t get an offer
will remain at school. Those who choose to leave school and don’t get an offer will be
unemployed. In all cases, if the agent gets the offer, he enters a productive match with the
firm.
At the production stage, a student gets bsk as the non-pecuniary utility from schooling
13
and pays ch as tuition. The utility from schooling can differ by type k and the tuition can
differ by schooling level h. An unemployed worker produces and consumes buk,a units of
output, which differs by type k and age a. A worker of (s, a) who is employed produces
yz0φ(s) units of output and consumes µ0 fraction of them. At the end of the produc-
tion stage, nature draws the measure of next period’s entering cohort from the distribution
Π(γˆ|γ). Throughout the paper, the caret indicates variables or functions in the next period.
2.3 Definition of Equilibrium
2.3.1 Worker’s problem
Consider a worker whose lifetime utility is V and who has the opportunity to look for a job
at the beginning of the search stage. His search decision is a choice of which µ to search.
If the worker searches in submarket (µ, s, a), he succeeds in finding a job with probability
p(θa(µ, s, ψ)), and fails with probability 1 − p(θa(µ, s, ψ)). If he succeeds, he enters the
production stage in a new employment relationship which gives him Ha(µ, s, z, ψ) lifetime
utility and which always pays µ fraction of his output throughout the duration of the em-
ployment relationship. If he fails to find a new match or if he doesn’t apply for a job, he
enters the production stage by retaining his current employment position, which gives him
a lifetime utility V. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility at the beginning of the search
stage is V +Ra(V, s, ψ), where R is the search value function defined as
Ra(V, s, ψ) = max{0,max
µ
p(θa(µ, s, ψ))[Ha(µ, s, z, ψ)− V ]} (2.1)
The worker maximizes the product of the probability of getting the offer and the extra
utility generated by the offer by choosing the µ. If there’s no choice of µ that generates a
higher value than V, the agent will remain in his current employment position. In this case,
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Ra(V, s, ψ) = 0. Denote m(µ, s, ψ) as the solution to the maximization problem in (2.1),
and p˜(µ, s, ψ) as the composite function of p(θ(m(µ, s, ψ), s, ψ)).
Now, let’s consider the search problem for an unemployed worker who has passed the
maximum schooling age A˜ and who therefore cannot decide to return to school. For a
worker of type (s, a) in market condition ψ, who is unemployed at the beginning of the
production stage, his lifetime utility at age a is Ua(s, ψ) such that
Ua(s, ψ) = b
u
k,a + βEψˆ|ψ[Ua+1(s, ψˆ) + λ
u
h,aRa+1(Ua+1(s, ψˆ), s, ψˆ)]
In the current period, the worker produces and consumes buk,a units of output, which
can differ by different age a and type k. In the next period, the worker’s skill doesn’t
change because he was unemployed in the previous period (here I assume that there is no
depreciation of skills). He gets the opportunity to search the labor market with probability
λuh,a. In this case, the worker’s continuation utility is Ua+1(s, ψˆ) + Ra+1(Ua+1(s, ψˆ), s, ψˆ).
The worker has a probability of 1 − λuh,a of not having the opportunity to search in the
next period. In this case, the worker remains unemployed and his continuation utility is
Ua+1(s, ψˆ). I denote xua+1(s, ψˆ) as the policy function for the search problem.
For unemployed workers who are younger than the maximum schooling age, they make
an additional decision about returning to school Iua (s, ψ).
Ua(s, ψ) =b
u
k,a + βEψˆ|ψ[ max
Iu∈{0,1}
{Iu(Wa+1(s, ψˆ)− cuh)
+ (1− Iu)(Ua+1(s, ψˆ) + λuh,gRa+1(Ua+1(s, ψˆ), s, ψˆ))}] (2.2)
If a worker decides to return to school, he gets the value of schooling Wa+1(s, ψˆ) and
pays a transition cost cuh that varies by schooling level. If the value of returning to school is
greater than the value of staying in the labor market, Iua (s, ψ) = 1, otherwise, I
u
a (s, ψ) = 0.
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The rest of the problem remains the same.
Next, consider a worker who is employed at the beginning of the production stage with
wage contract µ0 and match productivity z0. Denote Ha(µ0, s, z0, ψ) as his lifetime utility
at age a. Again, I first consider the worker’s problem for those who are older than A˜.
Ha(µ0, s, z0, ψ) = µ0yz0φ(s) + βEψˆ|ψ max
d∈{δh,1}
{dUa+1(s˜, ψˆ)
+(1− d)[Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ) + λeh,aRa+1(Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, ψˆ), s˜, ψˆ)]}
where the current period skill is s = (h,X,R, α0), and there two possible next period
skills, s˜ = (h, Xˆ, 0, α0) and sˆ = (h, Xˆ, Rˆ, α0). s˜ are the workers’ skills in the next period
without taking into account firm-specific skills and sˆ are the workers’ skills in the next
period including firm-specific skills. For unemployed workers and workers who switch
jobs, only s˜ matters, while for workers who stay in their current jobs, sˆ matters. Xˆ and Rˆ
are experience and tenure in the next period, and they follow a law of motion specified in
Chapter 2.3.4.
In the current period, the worker consumes µ0yz0φ(s) units of output, where z0 is the
match-specific productivity determined at the time of the creation of the match. z0 can be
different from the current match productivity z, which is an element in ψ. At the sepa-
ration stage of the next period, the worker has probability d of becoming unemployed. If
there’s endogenous separation, that is, workers voluntarily separate from the firm because
the value of non-employment is higher than the value of employment, d = 1, otherwise,
d = δh, which is the exogenous separation rate. If the worker separates from the firm, his
continuation utility is Ua+1(s˜, ψˆ) because he can not search in the next period. If there’s
no separation, at the search stage of the next period, the worker has probability 1 − λeh,g
of not having the opportunity to search in the labor market. In this case, the worker and
firm remain matched and the continuation value is Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ). If the worker gets
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the opportunity to search the labor market in the search stage, the worker’s continuation
utility is Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ) + Ra+1(Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ), s˜, ψˆ). I denote xea+1(µ0, s, z0, ψˆ) as
the policy function of the on-the-job search problem.
Employed workers who are younger than A˜ make an additional decision about whether
to return to school Iea(µ0, s, z0, ψˆ). If individuals choose to return to school, they get the
value of schooling Wa+1(s, ψˆ) and pay a transition cost ceh that varies by schooling level.
Ha(µ0, s, z0, ψ) = µ0yz0φ(s) + βEψˆ|ψ max
Ie∈{0,1},d∈{δh,1}
{Ie(Wa+1(s˜, ψ˜)− ceh)
+(1− Ie)dUa+1(s˜, ψˆ)
+(1− Ie)(1− d)[Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ) + λeh,gRa+1(Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ), s˜, ψˆ)]}
(2.3)
2.3.2 Student’s problem
Consider an agent who is still in school. The student’s lifetime utility Wa(s, ψ), is such
that
Wa(s, ψ) =b
s
k − ch + βEψˆ|ψ max
In∈{0,1}
{In[Wa+1(sˆ, ψˆ) + λnhRa+1(Wa+1(sˆ, ψˆ), sˆ, ψˆ)]
+ (1− In)[Ua+1(sˆ, ψˆ) + λnhRa+1(Ua+1(sˆ, ψˆ), sˆ, ψˆ)]} (2.4)
where s = (h,X, 0, α0) and sˆ = (h+ 1, X, 0, α0).
In the current period, the student needs to pay ch tuition and gets bsk non-pecuniary
utility from schooling. I assume that the non-pecuniary utility for cohort t is bsk = b
0
k + b
1
kt,
where b1k is an exogenous time trend in the consumption value of schooling. Both b
0 and
b1 are type-specific. As shown in Heckman and LaFontaine (2010), there has been a linear
trend in the school enrollment rates for cohorts born from 1930 to 1980. The exogenous
time trend in the consumption value of schooling allows me to fit the upward trend in the
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school enrollment rates observed in the data.
Students make decisions about whether to stay in school Ina+1(s, ψˆ) in the next pe-
riod. If they decide to stay in school (In = 1), in the next period, they get a search
probability λnh and the continuation utility is Wa+1(sˆ, ψˆ) + λ
n
hRa+1(Wa+1(sˆ, ψˆ), sˆ, ψˆ). The
reservation utility in the search problem is Wa+1(sˆ, ψˆ) because if individuals do not get
an offer in the next period, they will stay in school. If they decide to enter the labor
market (In = 0), they will become unemployed if they do not get an offer in the next
period. The continuation utility of individuals who choose to enter the labor market is
Ua+1(sˆ, ψˆ) + λ
u
h,gRa+1(Ua+1(sˆ, ψˆ), sˆ, ψˆ). I denote I
n
a+1(sˆ, ψˆ), x
n
a+1(sˆ, ψˆ) (optimal market
to search while in school) and xua+1(sˆ, ψˆ) (optimal market to search while in the labor mar-
ket) as the policy function associated with (2.4).
2.3.3 Firm’s problem
Consider a firm that employs a worker for a wage as a proportion µ0 of the output at the
beginning of the production stage, and denotes as Ja(µ0, s, z0, ψ) its lifetime profit.
Ja(µ0, s, z0, ψ) = (1− µ0)yz0φ(s) + βEψˆ|ψ[(1− Iea+1(µ0, s, z0, ψˆ))
(1− da+1(µ0, s, z0, ψˆ))(1− λeh,ap˜(Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ), s˜, ψˆ))Ja+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ)] (2.5)
where s, sˆ, and s˜ are defined the same as in the employed worker’s problem. In the current
period, the firm’s profit is given by (1−µ0)yz0φ(s). The discounted sum of profits from the
next period onward is Ja+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ) times the probability that the worker remains with
the firm in the next period, which is the product of the probability of not returning to school
(1 − Iea+1(µ0, s, z0, ψˆ)), the probability of not being unemployed (1 − da+1(µ0, s, z0, ψˆ)),
and the probability of not having an outside offer (1− λeh,ap˜(Ha+1(µ0, sˆ, z0, ψˆ), s˜, ψˆ)).
During a search stage, a firm chooses whether and where to open a vacancy. The
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firm’s benefit of creating a vacancy in a submarket (s, a, µ) is the product of the matching
probability q(θa(µ, s, ψ)), and the value of meeting a worker, Ja(µ, s, z, ψ). Here the state
space z0 = z because match-specific productivity z0 is determined when the firm and the
worker meet, and thus will be the current match productivity shock z if the match is created.
The firm’s cost of creating a vacancy is κ. The tightness of the submarket is such that
κ ≥ q(θa(µ, s, ψ))Ja(µ, s, z, ψ) (2.6)
and θa(µ, s, ψ) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness. The above condition guarantees that
the tightness function θ is consistent with the firm’s incentive to create vacancies. Condition
(2.6) states that if the vacancy-to-applicant ratio in submarket (µ, s, a) is strictly positive,
the cost of opening a vacancy must be equal to the benefit. Moreover, condition (2.6) states
that if the vacancy-to-applicant ratio in the submarket is equal to zero, the cost to a firm of
opening a vacancy must be larger than the benefit.
2.3.4 Law of Motion
In order to reduce the size of the state space, I assume that experience X and tenure R each
take on P values, so that the possible values of experience and tenure arranged in ascending
order are
X ∈ XC = {x(1), ..., x(P )}
R ∈ RC = {r(1), ..., r(P )}
After each quarter of work experience, human capital increases to the next level with prob-
ability p, and with probability (1− p) human capital does not increase. There are separate
skill increase probabilities for experience and tenure, and the rates of skill increase are
also allowed to vary by skill level. The skill increase parameters are {plX , plR, l = 1, ..., P},
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where the subscriptsX andR refer to experience and tenure, and l indexes levels. When ex-
perience improves to the next level, the agent’s skill increases by α2. When tenure reaches
the next level, the agent’s skill increases by α3. The human capital transition probabilities
are known by agents in the model. The size of the state space is significantly reduced when
P is a small number relative to the possible values of years of experience and tenure, but
the model still captures the human capital improvement process. In this work, P = 4.
For the law of motion of aggregate shocks (yt, zt), I follow Eyigungor (2010) and as-
sume a first order Markov process of the form below:
log(yt+1)
log(zt+1)
 =
ρy 0
0 ρz

log(yt)
log(zt)
+
y,t
z,t

Innovation (y,t, z,t) are serially independent, multivariate normal random variables dis-
tributed as below: y,t
z,t
 ∼ N

0
0
 ,
 σ2y ρy,zσyσz
ρy,zσyσz σ
2
z


2.3.5 Definition of equilibrium
Following Menzio and Shi (2010a) and Menzio et al. (2012), I define a Block Recursive
Equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of a market tightness func-
tion θa, a value function for the firm Ja, a value function for the unemployed worker, Ua,
policy functions for the unemployed worker, xua and I
u
a , a value function for the employed
worker, Ha, policy functions for the employed worker, da, xea, and I
u
a , a value function for
students Wa, and policy functions for the student, xna and I
n
a . These functions satisfy the
following conditions:
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(i) θa satisfies (2.6) for all submarkets (µ, s, a) and market conditions ψ.
(ii) Ua, xua and I
u
a satisfy (2.1) and (2.2) for all types of workers (s, a) and market condi-
tions ψ;
(iii) Ha, da, xea and I
e
a satisfy (2.1) and (2.3) for all submarkets (µ, s, a) with match pro-
ductivity z and market condition ψ;
(iv) Wa, Ina and x
n
a satisfy (2.1) and (2.4) for all types of workers (s, a) and market con-
ditions ψ;
(v) Ja satisfies (2.5) for all submarkets (µ, s, a) with match productivity z and market
condition ψ.
A Block Recursive Equilibrium is a recursive equilibrium in which the agents’ value
and policy functions depend on the aggregate state of the economy ψ only through pro-
ductivity shocks y and z. The equilibrium is block recursive because the search process
is directed. In fact, with directed search, workers with different characteristics choose to
search in different submarkets. As a result of this self-selection process, a firm that opens a
vacancy in a particular submarket knows that it will meet only one type of worker. Hence,
the firm’s expected value from meeting a worker does not depend on the distribution of
workers across employment states, and because of firms’ free entry, the probability that the
firm meets an applicant must have the same property. Therefore, agents’ value and policy
functions will also be independent of the distribution.
In Appendix A, I present the solution to the equilibrium and formally prove that there
exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium. Furthermore, I formally prove that policy functions
and value functions depend on the aggregate state of the economy only through aggregate
shocks, and not on the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states.
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Chapter 3
Data
The data sets used in this paper are Monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1980
to 2012, and National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) 1979 (from 1979 to 2010)
and 1997 (from 1997 to 2010).
The Current Population Survey, a monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau
of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, provides a comprehensive body of infor-
mation on the employment and unemployment experience of the US population, classified
by age, sex, race, and a variety of other characteristics. In addition, individual weekly in-
come information becomes available in the monthly survey beginning in 1982.1 I use the
CPS to construct quarterly wage and employment data conditioned on age and schooling.
Quarterly wage is calculated by mutiplying weekly income by 13 (13 weeks per quarter)
and has been inflation adjusted to 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. An agent
is defined as employed if he worked more than 30 hours last week. An agent is defined as
in school if his school enrollment status is full time. The CPS is surveyed via a 4-8-4 sam-
pling scheme. Households are in the survey for four consecutive months, out for eight, and
then return for another four months before leaving the sample permanently. This design
1I also use individual annual income data from March CPS for 1980 and 1981 because I perform a coun-
terfactual analysis to evaluate the welfare loss from the 1981-1983 recession.
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ensures a high degree of continuity from one month to the next (as well as over the year)
and allows me to match individuals across quarters. By matching the households surveyed
in the first month and fourth month, I am able to calculate quarterly transition rates be-
tween employment status (schooling, employment and unemployment) and transition rates
between employers. In this paper, the sample is restricted to the white-male sample because
their labor supply decisions are least sensitive to external factors such as childbearing or
discrimination. The CPS data provides a larger variation in the labor market conditions at
the time of labor market entry compared to longitudinal surveys that only follow a certain
number of cohorts. The total sample size from the CPS used in the estimation is 13 million.
Although monthly CPS can be used to calculate the distributions of income, employ-
ment and labor market transitions by cohort and age, being primarily a cross-sectional data
set, it does not contain a history of employment choices that would enable the calculation
of work experience and tenure. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and 1997
are longitudinal data sets that can be used to calculate statistics that are conditioned on
experience and tenure. The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young
men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979. The
NLSY97 consists of a nationally representative sample of approximately 9,000 youths who
were 12 to 16 years old in 1996. In both surveys, youths continue to be interviewed on an
annual or bi-annual basis. The latest data I can get is from 2010. Anyone working more
than 390 hours in a quarter (30 hours per week for 13 weeks) is considered employed and
anyone less than that is not. Using the weekly working hours data, I am able to construct the
whole working history and calculate work experience. Then, I calculate the hourly wage
(total earnings divided by hours worked) and multiply by 390 to get a quarterly earnings
equivalent, which is what I use for their quarterly wage. The NLSY data sets also report
the start and stop date for each job. Using the employer history data, I collect information
on tenure and transitions between employers. I only keep the sample including those who
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were 16 years old or less at the time of the first survey because I need to track the whole
working history. I also restrict the sample to white males only, which leaves me with 32,000
observations.
24
Chapter 4
Identification
There are four groups of parameters to be identified: search parameters, aggregate shocks,
wage parameters and utility parameters. Search parameters include vacancy cost, κ, ex-
ogenous separation rate, δh, the probability that a student/unemployed worker/employed
worker gets to search, λnh/λ
u
h,a/λ
e
h,a, and matching function parameter. Aggregate shocks
include aggregate productivity shocks yt and match productivity shocks zt. Wage param-
eters include type-specific human capital endowment α0, return to schooling α1, return
to experience α2, and return to tenure α3. Utility parameters include the preference for
schooling bsk, preference for leisure b
u
k,a and cost of schooling ch.
The identification of search parameters follows Menzio and Shi (2011). For the match-
ing function, I use the functional form introduced by den Haan et al. (2000):
m(u, v) =
uv
(uρ + vρ)1/ρ
This function ensures that the probability of finding a job and filling a vacancy always lies
between 0 and 1. Define θ as market tightness ratio, which is the ratio of firms searching
for workers to workers searching for firms, v/u. The probability of a searching worker
matching a firm is p(θ) = (x−ρ+1)−1/ρ. The parameter in the matching function, ρ, can be
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identified from the job-to-job transition rates of workers with different tenure values, hold-
ing other things equal. The offer arrival rates observed by the researchers are the product of
search probability λeh,a and the match probability p(θ). On-the-job search probability will
be the same for workers having the same age and schooling, but they will face different
p(θ) because they choose to search in different µ due to their different skills. This allows
me to trace down the matching function and identify ρ.
I normalize the search probability for unemployed worker having the lowest age and
schooling level to be 1. Therefore, vacancy cost κ can be identified using average transi-
tion rates from unemployment to employment for this group. Exogenous separation rates δh
can be identified using the average transition rates from employment to unemployment of
workers with different schooling levels. The search probability for students λnh can be iden-
tified using transition rates from schooling to employment. Transition rates from schooling
to employment equal search probability λnh times the probability of matching p(θ). The
matching probability is endogenously determined in the equilibrium and can be calculated
from the student’s search problem. Therefore, I am able to back up λnh using transition
rates divided by p(θ). Similarly, transition rates from unemployment to employment by
age and schooling can be used to identify the search probability for unemployed workers,
λuh,a. Job-to-job transition rates by age and schooling can be used to identify the search
probability for employed workers, λeh,a.
Productivity shocks yt and zt can be identified from the wage fluctuations and unem-
ployment fluctuations over the business cycle. First, aggregate productivity shocks yt can
be directly identified from the wage profile:
logwia,t = log µ
i
0,a + log yt + logz
i
0,a + α
i
0 + α1h
i
a + α2X
i
a + α3R
i
a + η
i
t
where ηit is the measurement error. yt is the only element in the wage profile that changes
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with calendar time. Match productivity shocks zt can be identified from the unemployment
rate at calendar time t. If there’s a positive match productivity shock zt, the payoff to a
firm of hiring a worker is higher, thus more firms would like to post vacancies. Therefore,
market tightness θ will increase, job offer arrival rates will increase and the unemployment
rate will decrease. Since the unemployment rate is decreasing in zt, zt can be identified. I
normalize the mean of yt and mean of zt to be 0.
For wage parameters, the wage profile conditional on schooling, experience and tenure
can help to identify α1, α2, and α3, respectively. However, I only observe accepted wages,
not wage offers. So I use age as an exclusion restriction. Age does not directly enter the
wage profile, but will affect the observed wage because it affects what submarket individ-
uals can search in and what µ they will search.
The type-dependent initial human capital endowments α0 are identified from the first
and second moments of wage over age. Note that what’s left to be identified in the constant
of wage is log µi + αi0. Although both µ
i and αi0 are unobserved to researchers, µ
i is
not a parameter, but an equilibrium outcome that is determined in the individuals’ search
problem. Given other parameters, I can calculate the equilibrium µi, which is a function
of αi0 and other observables. Below is a simple example to identify the type-specific initial
endowment with two types. Suppose there are two types of individuals in the economy:
pi fraction of the population is type 1 with α10 and 1 − pi fraction of the population is type
2 with α20. At age 1, type 1 individuals with initial endowment α
1
0 will choose µ
1
1, and
type 2 individuals will choose µ21. At age 2, type 1 individuals will choose µ
1
2, and type 2
individuals will choose µ22. Let’s refer log µ
i +αi0 to wage residual for the simplicity of the
argument. Mean of wage residual at age 1 is pi(α10 + log µ
1
1) + (1−pi)(α20 + log µ21). Square
mean of wage residual at age 1 is pi(α10 + log µ
1
1)
2 + (1 − pi)(α20 + log µ21)2. And mean of
wage residual at age 2 is pi(α10 + log µ
1
2) + (1− pi)(α20 + log µ22). With three equations and
three unknowns, I can solve for α10, α
2
0 and pi.
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Lastly, the identification of utility parameters follows Keane and Wolpin (1997). Pref-
erence for leisure can be identified from the distribution of employment by age. Preference
for schooling can be identified from the distribution of highest grade completed. Costs of
high school are assumed to be 0 and costs of college and graduate school are identified
from school enrollment rates by schooling level.
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Chapter 5
Estimation Method
When estimating the model, I assume that the discount factor β equals 0.99. To reduce the
number of parameters that need to be estimated, I divide schooling level into four groups,
including high school dropouts (years of schooling < 12), high school graduates (years
of schooling = 12), some college (12 < years of schooling < 16), and college graduates
(years of schooling≥ 16). I also divide age into five groups, including 16-25, 26-35, 36-45,
46-55, and 56-65. I impose the assumption that the search probabilities (λnh, λ
u
h,a, λ
e
h,a) are
the same for individuals in the same schooling group and age group. Values of leisure buk,a
are restricted to be the same for people in the same age group. Similarly, costs of schooling
ch are restricted to be the same for people in the same schooling group.
Estimation is done by simulated method of moments. In particular, a weighted squared
deviation between sample aggregate statistics and their simulated analogs is minimized
with respect to the model’s parameters. The weights are the inverses of the estimated
variances of the sample statistics.
The simulated aggregate statistics are generated from samples starting with cohorts that
turned age 16 in 1933, and thus turned 65 in 1982, and ending with cohorts that turned 16
in 2012. I simulate the behavior of samples of 800 individuals per cohort. Cross sectional
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simulated statistics, therefore, contain 40,000 observations.
The estimation contains two steps: an inner loop and an outer loop. In the inner loop,
I first simulate a series of productivity shocks (yt and zt) from 1931 to 1979 given a guess
of the parameters in the Markov process. Then I simulate idiosyncratic shocks 100 times
for each individual during this period. Given a series of simulated aggregate shocks and
idiosyncratic shocks, I simulate the behaviors of all cohorts from 1931 to 1979. I repeat the
above step 100 times by drawing 100 different series of aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic
shocks from year 1931 to year 1979. Starting in 1980, I simulate 100 series of idiosyncratic
shocks for each individual up to year 2012. Because the quarterly wage and employment
data are available during this period 1, given the simulated idiosyncratic shocks, I can iden-
tify aggregate shocks yt and zt for each period by searching for a combination of yt and zt
for every quarter that best fits the wage and unemployment rate from CPS data. Given the
identified aggregate shocks and simulated idiosyncratic shocks in 1980-2012, I simulate
the behaviors of all cohorts and compute the simulated moments.
In the outer loop, I estimate the Markov process using the identified yt and zt from 1980
to 2012 from the inner loop. Then I update the parameters in the Markov process using the
estimates and do the inner loop again. The above step is repeated until the parameters in
the Markov process converge, that is, rational expectation holds and the estimated yt and zt
follow the Markov process.
The aggregate productivity shocks and match productivity shocks used to match the
wage fluctuation and employment fluctuation are shown in Figure 5.1. In particular, my
model is able to simulate the 1981-82 recession, the 1991-1992 recession, the 2001 reces-
sion, and the recent Great Recession. As shown in Figure 5.1, wage and employment rate
can have different patterns and they do not necessarily move together. Using two produc-
tivity shocks allows me to fit both wage and employment fluctuations over the business
1Quarterly wages for 1980 and 1981 are not available from monthly CPS, so I use March CPS to obtain
annual wage information and divided it by 4.
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cycle very well. The green lines show the underlying shocks used in each quarter to fit
the data, which are plotted in the secondary axis. In general, a positive match productivity
shock will increase the value of new matches and the number of openings, hence increas-
ing employment rate. Since the match productivity only affects the values of new matches,
not existing matches, it has a smaller impact on wages than on employment. At the same
time, a positive aggregate productivity shock will increase wages as well as employment.
Overall, wages fluctuate less than employment over the business cycle.
Figure 5.1: Actual and predicted employment and wages in 1982 - 2012
I compute the simulated moments and compare them with sample aggregate statistics,
which are listed as follows:
31
1. Employment
(a) CPS: Proportion of employment by year, age and schooling.
(b) NLSY: Proportion of employment by experience and tenure.
2. Wages
(a) CPS: Mean and variance of quarterly wages by year and schooling; mean of
quarterly wages by year and age.
(b) NLSY: Mean of quarterly wages by experience and tenure.
3. Schooling
(a) CPS: Distribution of highest grade completed by year and age; Proportion of
individuals in school by year and age.
4. Transitions
(a) CPS: Quarterly transition of schooling to unemployment (SU), schooling to
employment (SE), unemployment to employment (UE), employment to unem-
ployment (EU), and between jobs (EE) by year, age and schooling.
(b) NLSY: Quarterly transition rates between jobs (EE) by tenure.
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Chapter 6
Results
6.1 Parameter Estimates and Moment Fit
The parameter estimates, and their asymptotic standard errors (in parentheses) are shown
in Tables 6.1 - 6.4. Table 6.1 shows the parameters in the wage function. Table 6.2 shows
the parameters in the flow utility of agents. Table 6.3 shows the search parameters. Table
6.4 shows the aggregate shocks evolvement process.
The model aims to match the distributions of wages, employment, and labor market
transition transitions over the life cycle and over the business cycle. Figure 6.1 and Figure
6.2 show the fit over the life cycle and Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4 and Table 6.5 show the fit
over the business cycle.
Figure 6.1 shows the moment fit of quarterly wages and employment by schooling
and years after labor market entry. Employment probability slightly increases in the first
ten years, then becomes flat, and decreases 30 years after entry. In addition, people with
higher education levels are more likely to be employed. My model is able to predict the
employment patterns by schooling and potential experience mainly because of the type-
and age-dependent values of leisure. Wages rise rapidly in the first 15 years and become
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Table 6.1: Parameter estimates: wage parameters
Return to schooling (α1) 0.1308(0.0042)
Return to experience (α2) 0.3784(0.0068)
Return to tenure (α3) 0.0525(0.0004)
Transition probability from level 1 to 2 for experience (p1X) 0.0630(0.0022)
Transition probability from level 2 to 3 for experience (p2X) 0.0712(0.0038)
Transition probability from level 3 to 4 for experience (p3X) 0.0548(0.0023)
Transition probability from level 1 to 2 for tenure (p1T ) 0.0224(0.0016)
Transition probability from level 2 to 3 for tenure (p2T ) 0.0116(0.0010)
Transition probability from level 3 to 4 for tenure (p3T ) 0.0071(0.0008)
Initial human capital endowment for type 1 (α01) 6.3925(0.4802)
Initial human capital endowment for type 2 (α02) 6.5980(0.3994)
Initial human capital endowment for type 3 (α03) 6.5235(0.6673)
Fraction of type 1 individuals (pi1) 0.2779(0.0265)
Fraction of type 2 individuals (pi2) 0.4834(0.0588)
Standard error of wage measurement error (ση) 0.2481(0.0072)
flat afterwards. People with higher education levels get higher wages and receive a larger
wage increase as they work longer. The wage profile simulated from the model is able to
capture the differences between education groups and the upward trend corresponding with
potential experience.
Figure 6.2 shows the labor market transition by years after labor market entry. The
upper left corner shows transition rates from unemployment to employment (UE). The rate
decreases as potential experience increases, starting from 50% at the time of entry and
dropping to 5% 40 years after entry. The decline in the UE rate is partly due to the decline
in workers’ work-life expectancy, which reduces their value to the firms as production part-
ners. It’s also because value of leisure increases and search probability for unemployed
workers declines as age increases. The upper right corner shows the transition rates from
employment to unemployment (EU) by schooling and potential experience. EU rates de-
cline in the first 20 years, and start to increase 20 years after labor market entry. The decline
in the EU in the first 20 years is due to the increase in µ through on-the-job search, and the
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Table 6.2: Parameter estimates: utility parameters
Utility from schooling
Type Constant (b0k) Trend (b
1
k)
1 739(85) 15.01(6.59)
2 1, 538(189) 21.79(10.7)
3 3, 388(247) 39.46(12.4)
HS dropout High school Some col-
lege
College
Tuition (c) 0 0 3,578 (126) 4,483 (148)
US transition cost (cu) 21,473(389) 20,148 (435) 40,482 (410) 23,102 (372)
ES transition cost (ce) 9,692(157) 13,089 (302) 25,389 (224) 10,122 (134)
Utility from unemployment (buk,a)
Age group
Type 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
1 1, 684(187) 2, 382(82) 4, 727(128) 6, 427(207) 7, 899(311)
2 3, 182(214) 2, 467(90) 4, 833(133) 6, 589(216) 12, 924(462)
3 6, 342(393) 2, 525(95) 4, 964(145) 6, 530(224) 20, 614(683)
Figure 6.1: Actual and predicted employment and wages by schooling and potential expe-
rience
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Table 6.3: Parameter estimates: search parameters
Vacancy posting cost (k) 1, 400(153)
Matching function parameter (ρ) 1.000(0.016)
Exogenous separation rate for high school dropout (δ1) 0.062(0.003)
Exogenous separation rate for high school graduate (δ2) 0.044(0.002)
Exogenous separation rate for some college (δ3) 0.029(0.002)
Exogenous separation rate for college graduate (δ4) 0.021(0.001)
Search probability – unemployed workers (λuh,a)
Education
Age HS dropout High school Some college College
16-25 1.000 0.553 (0.034) 0.798 (0.078) 0.404 (0.051)
26-35 0.924 (0.053) 0.456 (0.020) 0.335 (0.029) 0.322 (0.005)
36-45 0.775 (0.037) 0.366 (0.009) 0.384 (0.015) 0.288 (0.006)
46-55 0.410 (0.022) 0.394 (0.018) 0.252 (0.018) 0.144 (0.008)
56-65 0.362 (0.010) 0.178 (0.004) 0.067 (0.004) 0.055 (0.003)
Search probability – employed workers (λeh,a)
Education
Age HS dropout High school Some college College
16-25 1.000 (0.015) 1.000 (0.011) 1.000 (0.011) 1.000 (0.009)
26-35 1.000 (0.044) 1.000 (0.026) 1.000 (0.022) 1.000 (0.008)
36-45 1.000 (0.042) 1.000 (0.032) 1.000 (0.034) 1.000 (0.006)
46-55 1.000 (0.046) 1.000 (0.030) 1.000 (0.027) 1.000 (0.007)
56-65 1.000 (0.039) 1.000 (0.033) 1.000 (0.025) 1.000 (0.009)
Search probability – students (λnh)
HS dropout High school Some college College
0.054 (0.012) 0.997 (0.026) 0.129 (0.039) 0.972 (0.088)
Table 6.4: Parameter estimates: aggregate shocks evolvement process
Autoregressive coefficient of aggregate productivity (ρy) 0.9904(0.0324)
Standard error of shocks to aggregate productivity (σy) 0.0032(0.0003)
Autoregressive coefficient of match productivity (ρz) 0.8110(0.0268)
Standard error of shocks to match productivity (σz) 0.0924(0.0007)
Correlation coefficient of aggregate shocks (ρyz) 0.1033(0.0492)
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Figure 6.2: Actual and predicted labor market transitions by potential experience
decline after 20 years is due to the increase in value of leisure. The bottom left corner shows
the job-to-job transition rates (EE) by schooling and potential experience. There’s a sharp
decrease in EE transitions in the first 10 years, and the decrease slows down afterwards.
The decline in the EE rate is caused initially by the increase in µ and later by the decline
in the workers’ work-life expectancy. The bottom right corner shows the transition from
school to employment (SE) and transitions from school to unemployment (SU) by school-
ing. Both SE and SU rates are low before grade 12, and spike at grade 12, when many
people leave high school. After grade 12, both transition rates become low again until peo-
ple reach grade 16, when many people leave college. This is because search probabilities
are high for students at grade 12 and after grade 16.
Figure 6.3 shows the fit of the detrended school enrollment rate between 1980 and
2012.1 The figure shows that school enrollment rates increased in a bust and decreased
1Here I take a linear trend.
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Figure 6.3: Actual and predicted school enrollment rate in 1982 - 2012
in a boom. For example, in the recent recession, school enrollment rates were 2% - 3%
larger than the trend. My model is able to capture the countercyclical pattern of the school
enrollment rate over the business cycle.
Figure 6.4 shows labor market transitions over the business cycle. Employment rate is
also plotted in this figure on the secondary axis as an indicator of the business cycle. The
upper left figure shows the UE transitions in 1980 - 2012. My model is able to predict the
procyclical pattern. For example, during the 2008 recession, the predicted UE transition
rates dropped from 22% to 17%. The upper right figure shows EU transitions over the
business cycle. My model is able to capture the counter-cyclical pattern. During the recent
recession, the predicted EU transition rates increased from 5% to 6.5%. The lower left
figure shows EE transitions over the business cycle. Since employer information is not
available in CPS until 1994, I can only compute the EE transitions after 1994. My model
is able to capture the procyclical pattern. During the recent recession, the predicted EE
transition rates dropped from 8% to 5%. The lower right figure shows SE and SU transitions
over the business cycle. My model can predict the procyclical pattern of SE transition.
During the recent recession, the predicted SE transition rates dropped from 15% to 11%. In
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Figure 6.4: Actual and predicted labor market transitions in 1982 - 2012
addition, my model is able to predict the counter-cyclical pattern of SU transition. During
the recent recession, the predicted SU transition rates increased from 11% to 17%.
I also run an AR(1) regression on employment rate using my simulated employment
rates across quarters. I compare my regression coefficients with the coefficients from an
AR(1) regression using the actual employment rate from CPS. The autoregressive coeffi-
cient from the data is 0.929, compared to 0.925 from the model. I run the same regressions
for average wages across quarters using both data from CPS and simulated data from the
estimated model. The autoregressive coefficient of wage from the data is 0.950, pretty close
to the number I calculate with the model, which is 0.948. The details of the regressions are
shown in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5: Moment fit: AR(1) regression on employment and earnings
AR(1) regression on log employment rate (log(Et))
Data Model
log(Et−1) 0.929** 0.925**
[0.035] [0.013]
constant -0.013** -0.014**
[0.006] [0.003]
AR(1) regression on log wage (log(Wt))
Data Model
log(Wt−1) 0.950** 0.948**
[0.028] [0.017]
constant 0.471* 0.489**
[0.216] [0.135]
Standard errors in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1%.
6.2 Discussion
Table 6.6 tests the correlation between unemployment rate at the time of labor market en-
try and future wages for while-male college graduates. I run a regression of log wage on
unemployment rate at college graduation and the interaction between college unemploy-
ment rate and potential experience, which mimics the work of Kahn (2010). The results
also include controls for a quadratic in potential experience, contemporaneous year effects
and the contemporaneous unemployment rate. In Kahn (2010), she used NLSY79 white
males with at least a BA/BS and found a negative correlation between wages and the unem-
ployment rate at the time of college graduation (UCollege). The coefficient of the interaction
between college unemployment rate and potential experience was found to be insignificant,
indicating that the wage loss was persistent. In a robustness check, she also used March
CPS data 1988-2007, restricting the sample to workers who turned 22 between 1986 and
1996. The magnitude of the initial wage loss was smaller and the loss was less persistent.
The regression results using simulated data from my model are similar to Kahn’s findings.
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Table 6.6: “Scarring effect” on wages
Kahn (2010) Model
NLSY79 CPS(1988-2007)
Ucollege -0.062* -0.040* -0.058**
[0.021] [0.011] [0.010]
Ucollege * Exp 0.000 0.005* 0.006**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Kahn (2010) used NLSY79 white males with at least a BA/BS and March CPS data
1988-2007, restricting the sample to workers who turned 22 between 1986 and 1996.
I mimic her regression using the simulated samples with college degree.
Standard errors in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1%.
The results also include controls for a quadratic in potential experience, age adjusted
AFQT score (only for NLSY), contemporaneous year effects and the contemporane-
ous unemployment rate.
However, this OLS regression only shows correlation between unemployment rate and
wages, not causality. Firstly, running OLS regression ignores the schooling decisions dur-
ing the business cycle. The regression treats college unemployment rate and schooling as
exogenous, but in fact, they are endogenously determined because students can choose to
avoid bad economic condition at labor market entry by postponing their entry into the labor
market and staying at school during a recession. Therefore, OLS regression ignores the in-
crease in schooling due to the recession, which increases future wages and labor supply. In
addition, graduation cohorts can be differently selected. For example, if a recession induces
some people to complete college that they otherwise would not, there can be a change in
the workforce composition for college graduates across cohorts.
Moreover, longer term projections may be confounded by other economic shocks. It is
difficult to isolate the impact of an early career shock on future careers from other possible
determinants. Therefore, to analyze the impact of a recession on lifetime wages, we need
to conduct a counterfactual analysis.
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Chapter 7
Counterfactual Analysis
I conduct a counterfactual experiment to study the impact of experiencing the 1981-1982
recession as a youth.1 On average, there was a 3% decrease in the employment rate and
1.5% wage drop during the recession period.2 According to the estimation, it was caused
by a 0.5% decrease in aggregate productivity and 10% decline in match productivity (on
average). In the counterfactual, I first simulate the behaviors for cohorts who turned age
16 - 22 in year 1980 based on actual aggregate productivity shocks and match productivity
shocks. Then I simulate the behaviors for these cohorts again by replacing the negative
aggregate productivity shocks and match productivity shocks by 0 in 1981-1982. I compare
the difference in terms of lifetime welfare, wages and labor supply.
7.1 Welfare Analysis
Table 7.1 shows the impact of the 1981-82 recession by cohort. The table shows life-
time welfare loss for cohorts who turned age 16-22 in 1980. Welfare is measured by the
1The reason of picking the recession in 1981-82 is because the ones in 1990s and 2000s are small and the
recent recession is too severe. In addition, the data allows me to observe the labor market performance of
individuals who entered the labor market during the 1981-82 recession for 30 years.
2According to NBER, the recession started in the third quarter of 1981 and ended in the last quarter of
1982.
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Table 7.1: Welfare loss from the 1981-82 recession by cohort
Age in 1980 Total Workers Students
16 2.16% 3.92% 1.98%
17 2.33% 3.85% 2.05%
18 2.85% 3.71% 2.09%
19 2.96% 3.49% 2.17%
20 2.87% 3.15% 2.26%
21 2.82% 2.98% 2.28%
22 2.76% 2.79% 2.37%
Table 7.2: Welfare loss from the 1981-82 recession by schooling level
Schooling level in 1980 Welfare loss Max welfare loss* Change in schooling
10 2.02% 4.73% 0.34
12 2.14% 4.89% 0.25
14 2.27% 4.95% 0.17
16 2.39% 5.01% 0.04
* Maximum welfare loss is the welfare loss when people stay at home for 2 years
when they were hit by the recession at the time of potential entry.
discounted lifetime utility at age 16, which is measured in consumption dollars because
utility function is linear in consumption. In general, the impact of the 1981-82 recession
is smaller for cohorts who were younger when the recession started, especially for those
who were only 16 and 17 in 1980. This is because a large proportion of these younger
cohorts would stay at school anyway during the recession and they are not directly affected
by the recession. Moreover, the recession has a larger impact for those who were in the
labor market (workers) than those who stay at school (students) by the time the recession
started. This is again because attending school can shield agents from the direct impact of
the recession. The welfare loss is smaller for older workers because they had accumulated
some experience when the recession occurred.
Table 7.2 shows the impact of the 1981-82 recession for students with different school-
ing level by the time the recession started. Here I present the welfare loss for four schooling
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levels: grade 10, 12, 14, and 16. In general, higher educated groups suffer from a large wel-
fare loss. This is because on average, there is a 0.23-year increase in schooling due to the
recession, and the increase is large for lower educated groups, as shown in the last column.
For students with lower schooling levels, their tuition costs are lower, so they are more
likely to obtain more schooling during a recession.
In the second column of Table 7.2, I show the maximum welfare loss in the worst case
scenario, when individuals are forced to stay at home for two years until the recession ends.
In this case, after the recession, these unlucky cohort behaves the same as a lucky cohort
just leaving school, except that these unlucky cohorts have lost two years of earnings. In
this worst case scenario, individuals suffer a 5% welfare loss. When individuals have the
choice of going to school or working during a recession, welfare loss is reduced by half.
Figure 7.1: Impact of the 1981-82 recession on wage and employment
Figure 7.1 presents the percentage change in wages from the 1981-82 recession for
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those who have completed high school and those who have completed college in 1980. For
both groups of students, there was a large initial wage loss of 20% to 30% during the re-
cession. The wage drop was larger for high school graduates. After the recession, the wage
loss of high school graduates recovers in five years and there is even a 4% wage increase
after the recession because some students increase their schooling due to the recession.
In contrast, since college graduates merely increase their schooling during the recession,
their wage loss recovers much slowly, which fades in 10 years. These findings about col-
lege graduates are similar to those of Kahn (2010), where she finds that a 1% increase in
unemployment leads to a 7% to 9% initial wage loss that recovers in 15 years.
Figure 7.1 also presents the change in employment probability from the 1981-82 re-
cession for high school graduates and college graduates. Individuals suffer from a 10% to
25% decline in employment probability during the recession, and high school graduates
suffer more severely than college students because a large proportion of high school grad-
uates choose to attend school instead of working in the recession. After the recession, the
employment rate quickly recovers, which is consistent with findings in the literature that
there is no scarring effect on future unemployment in the US (e.g., Genda et al. (2010)).
For high school graduates, there is an increase in employment rate of one ppt, while college
grduates does not see an increase. This is because high school graduates acquire 0.29-year
more schooling than they would have without a recession, and the increase in schooling for
college graduates is subtle.
7.2 Importance of endogenizing schooling decisions
The above findings suggest that schooling plays an important role in the welfare analysis.
Schooling decisions have two potential effects in the welfare analysis, the insurance effect
and the composition effect. First, acquiring more schooling can partially shield agents
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Table 7.3: Impact of the 1980s recession on schooling for potential labor market entrants
Highest grade
completed
Change in years
of schooling
Fraction of
attending school
Change in laborforce
composition (α0)
High School Dropout 0.37 18.1% −0.0249
High School Graduate 0.29 15.7% −0.0134
Some College 0.19 12.5% −0.0066
College Graduate 0.05 4.2% −0.0015
from the negative impact of a recession. This is because the flow utility of schooling is not
affected by the business cycle and acquiring more schooling can increase future wages and
employment opportunities. Second, there can be selection problem if agents with different
characteristics make different schooling decisions over the business cycle. As a result, there
will be a change in the workforce composition in a recession.
Table 7.3 shows the impact on schooling from the 1981-82 recession for potential labor
market entrants who would have entered the labor market if the recession did not occur.
Here I present the impact on labor market entrants with different education levels. For
high school graduates, there is a 0.29-year increase in schooling due to the recession, while
there is only a 0.05-year increase for college graduates. The same pattern holds for fraction
of attending school. When the 1980s recession occurred, 15.7% of high school graduates
acquire more schooling due to the recession, while only 4.2% of college graduates do so.
The increase in schooling partially offsets the negative impact from a recession. Therefore,
those who undergo a larger increase in schooling incur a smaller welfare loss.
The last column of Table 7.3 shows a change in the laborforce composition with respect
to initial human capital (α0) during a recession. In general, those who choose to stay in
school during a recession have higher initial human capital endowment compared to those
who choose to enter the labor market. The difference is larger for lower educated groups.
For example, the difference for high school graduates is 0.0134, while the difference for
college graduates is 0.0015. The selection in terms of initial human capital is mainly be-
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cause individuals with higher initial human capital also have higher values in schooling,
as shown in the estimates in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Therefore, although workers with
higher initial human capital are less affected by a recession, they are more likely to stay
at school because they value school more. This selection problem from the schooling de-
cision suggests that it is important to endogenize the schooling decision over the business
cycle because the workforce composition with respect to unobserved initial human capital
is different across graduation cohorts.
T1: baseline; T2: ignore insurance effect; T3: ignore insurance effect and composition effect.
Figure 7.2: Insurance effect and composition effect of the schooling decision
To further illustrate the importance of endogenizing the schooling decision, Figure 7.2
presents the changes in wages and employment of high school students who would have
graduated from high school and entered the labor market without the 1981-82 recession.
T1 represents the case when these high school graduates are allowed to make schooling de-
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cisions during the recession, which captures the correct treatment effect. T2 represents the
case when high school graduates are prohibited from staying at school during the recession
and are forced to either work or stay at home. T2 ignores the insurance effect but takes into
account the composition effect. T3 is part of the treatment group who still chooses to enter
the labor market in a recession. In other words, T3 represents the high school graduates
in the recession. T3 reflects what is measured in the OLS regression. The OLS regression
compares the wages of students graduated in a boom with the wages of students graduated
in a bust, so it ignores both the insurance effect and composition effect.
For all groups, there is a significant wage drop during the recession. For T1, the wage
loss quickly recovers after the recession. Five years after the recession, wages recover to
the original level. Indeed, there is even a 4% wage increase 15 years after the recession.
However, if we ignore the schooling decisions made during a recession, T2 shows that we
will observe a much slower recovery and we won’t be able to get the future wage growth.
In this case, wage loss recovers in 8 years. If we further ignore the composition effect, T3
has the slowest recovery rate and there is a permanent wage loss because those with lower
initial human capital are more likely to enter the labor market in a recession.
The bottom figure shows the change in employment opportunities. For T2 and T3,
there is an initial decrease in employment rate of 10 ppt during the recession. For T1, there
is a larger initial decrease in employment rate compared to T2 and T3 because 15.7% of
the sample in T1 attend school during the recession. After the recession, all three groups
recover quickly and there is a 1-ppt increase seven years after the recession only for T1.
This is because workers with higher schooling face a higher UE transition rate and a lower
EU transition rate than workers with less education.
Therefore, when examining the impact of a recession on wages and employment, it
is important to endogenize the schooling decisions over the business cycle. If we ignore
the insurance effect or composition effect, we may underpredict the changes in wages and
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employment and overestimate the scarring effect on wages.
Table 7.4 shows the present values of wages, earnings and utility for high school grad-
uates at age 18 for the three treatment groups. For all three measures of the welfare loss,
ignoring the insurance effect (T2) overestimates the welfare loss, and ignoring both effects
(T3) causes a further overestimation. Note here using the present value of wages as the
welfare measure will cause underestimation of the welfare loss from a recession compared
to the present value of utility, because the calculation ignores those who were unemployed
and those who went to school in a recession and only accounts for those who were working.
If we treat those who are not working as having a zero earning and calculate the present
value of earnings, the measure is still not accurate because people enjoy the value of leisure
or value of schooling when they are not working. The correct measure of welfare should be
the present value of utility. The calculation of present values shows that the present value of
wages causes underestimation of the welfare loss and the present value of earnings causes
overestimation of the welfare loss. This finding suggests that it is necessary to develop and
estimate a life cycle model to recover the actual welfare loss from a recession.
Table 7.4: Changes in the lifetime values for high school graduates
Wages Earnings Welfare
T1 −1.92% −2.68% −2.56%
T2 −2.54% −3.02% −2.85%
T3 −2.92% −3.46% −3.17%
Note: T1: baseline; T2: ignore insurance effect; T3: ignore insurance effect and composi-
tion effect.
7.3 Wage decomposition
Now I would like to examine the mechanisms of the persistent wage loss by quantifying
different channels of wage change. From now on, without loss of generality, the analysis
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will be focus on high school graduates who plan to enter the labor market by the time the
recession started.
Individuals face a tradeoff when they enter the labor market during a recession. On the
one hand, they can start with a lower-paid job and catch up later through on-the-job search.
However, it may take time to climb up the wage ladder due to search frictions. On the other
hand, they can go to school or stay at home and wait until the recession is over. In this case,
at the later time of labor market entry, they will lose experience and tenure. Remember
that worker’s wage is a share of his current period output. Therefore, the wage loss can be
decomposed into the loss from the share and loss from the output. In the first case, workers
start in a job that offers a lower share while in the second case, the loss in experience and
tenure will be reflected in the loss in the output. Now I explore the impact of a recession
on experience, tenure and share of worker’s output.
Figure 7.3 presents the change in experience and tenure from a recession occurring at
potential entry. There is a five-quarter decrease in experience and the loss in experience
slowly recovers over time. This is because the employment probability increases after the
recession, as shown in Figure 7.1. Similarly for tenure, the recession causes a drop of six
quarters and it recovers in 18 years. There is a larger drop in tenure compared to experience
because workers switch jobs more often after the recession in order to climb up the wage
ladder.
The above analysis of experience and tenure captures the impact of a recession on
human capital accumulation. At the same time, a recession also affects job mobility. In the
model, workers search for a higher µ when they are doing on-the-job search, therefore, µ
captures the wage gain from moving up the wage ladder. Figure 7.4 presents the change
in µ from a recession occurring at potential entry and from a recession occurring 10 years
after entry. There is an initial drop of 10-15 ppt during the recession. It only takes three
years after the recession to catch up. Furthermore, µ is 1.5 ppt higher than the control group
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Figure 7.3: Impact on experience and tenure
ten years after the recession. This is because those who increase their schooling during a
recession can get a higher share of output from firms.
I conduct a wage decomposition analysis by exploring different channels of wage change.
There are four channels of wage change. First is through shocks to aggregate productivity
and match productivity, which are exogenous to agents. The rest of three channels are en-
dogenous. First, individuals can accumulate their human capital by acquiring more school-
ing. Second, they can also accumulate their human capital through learning-by-doing, that
is, by increasing their experience and tenure while working. Lastly, workers can also move
between jobs to search for a better wage offer that offers a larger share of output.
Figure 7.5 presents the wage decomposition for students who just completed high
school when the 1981-82 recession started. During the 1981-82 recession, negative ag-
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Figure 7.4: Impact on µ
gregate productivity shocks and match productivity shocks lead to a 10.5% decrease (on
average) in the productivity of new matches, which accounts for 40.7% of total wage loss.
After the recession, the aggregate productivity recovers while the negative match produc-
tivity shock is persistent within a match. If workers switch to a new job, they will get a new
draw of match productivity. Therefore, workers have strong incentives to switch jobs and
the wage loss from match productivity quickly diminishes after the recession.
Besides the exogenous productivity shocks, the majority of the wage loss comes from
the loss from µ. Wage loss from µ accounts for about 44.0% of the total wage loss during
the recession, while the loss from experience and tenure only accounts for 19.1% of the
wage loss. After the recession, the loss from µ recovers quickly, which only takes three
years, while it takes 15 years for the wage loss from the decreased experience and tenure
to fade out. This suggests that the loss in worker’s share of output is the major cause of
the huge wage loss during the recession and the loss in experience and tenure is the major
reason for the persistent wage loss after the recession.
At the same time, the increase in schooling leads to a direct increase in worker’s output,
which contributes to a 2.5% wage growth. Moreover, the increase in schooling helps work-
ers to get a large fraction of their output from firms. Therefore, the increase in schooling
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Figure 7.5: Wage decomposition
also has an indirect impact on wage growth by improving µ, which contributes to another
1.5% wage growth. Therefore, 15 years after the recession, when the negative impact from
the loss in experience and tenure disappears, there is a 4% wage increase because the in-
crease in schooling not only directly increases worker output, but also increases the share
of output workers can get from firms.
I do the same exercise for other education groups and the conclusion is similar: the
losses in productivity and µ are the two major causes of the wage loss during the recession.
The persistency of the wage loss after the recession is mainly explained by the loss in
experience and tenure.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this paper, I evaluate the lifetime welfare and labor market consequences from an early
career recession in a general equilibrium framework. I also explore the mechanisms that
account for lifetime wage changes by decomposing those changes into different channels:
changes from schooling, from work experience, and from job mobility.
The model is an extension of a directed search model, the Block Recursive Equilibrium
(BRE) framework by Menzio and Shi (2010a). Using BRE allows me to solve the model
outside of the steady state because the value functions and policy functions depend only
on aggregate shocks, and not the endogenous distribution of workers across wages and
employment states. Therefore, I can solve the model outside of the steady state. Further-
more, the framework can easily incorporate on-the-job search and endogenous separation.
I further extend this framework by endogenizing the schooling decision, introducing job
tenure, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in agents, and proposing a wage contract
that facilitates the wage decomposition analysis.
Counterfactual analysis shows that experiencing the 1981-1982 recession as a youth
causes a 2.2% to 3.0% lifetime welfare loss. The welfare loss is larger for students with
higher schooling level because they are less likely to acquire more schooling during the
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recession.
I find that endogenizing schooling decision is important for the welfare analysis for
two reasons, the insurance effect and the composition effect. The analysis shows that the
increase in schooling during a recession increases future wages and employment. I also find
that during a recession, there is a change in the workforce composition with respect to initial
human capital. Therefore, endogenizing schooling decisions can avoid overestimation of
the welfare loss.
Lastly, I also explore the mechanisms of the wage change. Wage decomposition shows
that loss from worker’s share of output explains the majority of wage loss during the re-
cession, but quickly recovers after the recession. In contrast, loss in experience and tenure
explains a small proportion of the wage loss, but takes longer to recover after the recession.
This model incorporates two types of productivity shocks that will affect wages and
unemployment. But the model does not have industry-specific productivity shocks and
does not distinguish between job-to-job transitions within industry and across industry.
Future studies can explore different sources of the business cycle and allow them to have
different impacts on workers working in different industries.
In addition, it is important to incorporate heterogeneous firms because firms with dif-
ferent productivity and different sizes may behave differently during a recession. It would
be interesting to see whether the impact of a recession varies by workers among different
firms. However, incorporating firms’ productivity will require employer-employee matched
panel data and allowing for heterogeneous firm is beyond the scope of this model, so I will
leave it for future research.
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Appendix A
Solution to the equilibrium
Since individuals live a finite life in this model, the equilibrium can be solved using back-
ward induction. At the last period A, the unemployment value functionUA, the employment
value function HA, and the firm value function JA satisfy the equilibrium conditions (iii),
(iv) and (vi) if and only if
UA(s, ψ) = b
u
A,k
HA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) = µyz¯φ(s)
JA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) = (1− µ)yz¯φ(s)
Notice that in the last period, the value functions of workers and firms depend only on
the current period’s payoff, not on the continuity values. Therefore, UA does not depend on
the aggregate state of the economy ψ and HA and JA depends only on the aggregate state
of the economy via the aggregate productivity shock y. Hence, without loss of generality, I
can write UA(s, ψ) = UA(s, y, z), HA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) = HA(µ, s, z¯, y, z), and JA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) =
JA(µ, s, z¯, y, z).
Given the firm’s value function in the last period, we can solve the market tightness
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function θA in the last period, which satisfies the equilibrium conditions (ii) and (vi) if and
only if
θA(µ, s, ψ) =

q−1
(
k
JA(µ, s, z, y, z)
)
, if JA(µ, s, z, y, z) ≥ k,
0, otherwise .
(A.1)
Note that θA(µ, s, ψ) depends on the fraction of output given to workers, µ, the workers’
skill, s, and aggregate shocks y and z, but not on other components of aggregate state of
the economy (n, u, e, γ). Hence, we can write θA(µ, s, ψ) = θA(µ, s, y, z).
The policy function xuA for unemployed workers satisfies the equilibrium condition (iii)
if and only if it solves the search problem
RA(UA(s, ψ), s, ψ) = max
µ
{p(θA(µ, s, y, z))[HA(µ, s, z, y, z)− UA(s, y, z)], 0} (A.2)
We can plug (A.1) into (A.2) to solve for µ. The solution depends only on (s, y, z). There-
fore, we can write xuA(s, ψ) = x
u
A(s, y, z).
The policy function xeA for employed workers satisfies the equilibrium condition (iv) if
and only if it solves the search problem
RA(HA(µ, s, z¯, ψ), s, ψ) = max
µ˜
{p(θA(µ˜, s, y, z))[HA(µ˜, s, z, y, z)−HA(µ, s, z¯, y, z)], 0}
(A.3)
We can plug (A.1) into (A.3) to solve for µ˜, which depends only on (µ, s, z¯, y, z). There-
fore, we can write xeA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) = x
e
A(µ, s, z¯, y, z).
The separation policy function dA satisfies the equilibrium condition (iv) if and only if
it solve the separation problem
max
d∈[δh,1]
dUA(s, y, z) + (1− d)[HA(µ, s, z¯, y, z) + λeh,ARA(HA(µ, s, z¯, y, z), s, y, z)] (A.4)
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We can rewrite the employment decision dA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) as
dA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) =

1, if UA(s, y, z) > HA(µ, s, z¯, y, z)
+ λeh,ARA(HA(µ, s, z¯, y, z), s, y, z),
δh, otherwise
The objective function in (A.5) depends only on the workers’ skill, s, on the piece-rate, µ,
and on the aggregate shocks y and z. Hence, dA(µ, s, z¯, ψ) = dA(µ, s, z¯, y, z).
In period A− 1, the unemployment value function UA−1 satisfies the equilibrium con-
dition (iii) if and only if
UA−1(s, ψ) = buA−1,k + βEψˆ|ψ[UA(s, yˆ, zˆ) + λ
u
h,ARA(UA(s, yˆ, zˆ), s, yˆ, zˆ)]
The employment value function HA−1 satisfies the equilibrium condition (iv) if and
only if
HA−1(µ, s, z¯, ψ) =µyz¯φ(s) + βEψˆ|ψ max
d∈[δh,1]
{dUA(s˜, yˆ, zˆ)
+ (1− d)[HA(µ, sˆ, z¯, yˆ, zˆ) + λeh,ARA(HA(µ, sˆ, z¯, yˆ, zˆ), s˜, yˆ, zˆ)]}
The employment value function JA−1 for firms is equal to
JA−1(µ, s, z¯, ψ) =(1− µ)yz¯φ(s) + βEψˆ|ψ[(1− dA(µ, s, z¯, yˆ, zˆ))
(1− λeh,Ap˜(HA(µ, sˆ, z¯, yˆ, zˆ), s˜, yˆ, zˆ))JA(µ, sˆ, z¯, yˆ, zˆ)]
Notice that UA−1, HA−1 and JA−1 depend on the aggregate state of the economy ψ
only via productivity shocks y and z. Using backward induction, we can show that policy
functions and value functions for employed workers and unemployed workers, as well as
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value functions for firms, depend only on the aggregate state of the economy ψ via the
aggregate shocks y and z, for all ages a ∈ {A,A− 1, ..., 1} .
Now let’s look at the student’s problem. At termination age A˜, a student must enter the
labor market in the next period. The schooling value function WA˜ is:
WA˜(s, ψ) = b
s
k − ch + βEψˆ|ψ[UA˜+1(s, yˆ, zˆ) + λnhRA˜+1(UA˜+1(s, yˆ, zˆ), s, yˆ, zˆ)]
At age A˜ + 1, students’ value depends only on the unemployment value function and the
search function, both of which only depends on y and z. Therefore, students’ value function
at age A˜ depends only on y: WA˜(s, ψ) = WA˜(s, y, z).
Next, I solve the searching problem for students at age A˜.
RA˜(UA˜(s, ψ), s, ψ) = maxµ
{p(θA˜(µ, s, y, z))[HA˜(µ, s, z, y, z)− UA˜(s, y, z)], 0}
As a result, the solution to the student search problem xn
A˜
depends only on ψ via produc-
tivity shocks, where xn
A˜
(s, ψ) = xn
A˜
(s, y, z).
The schooling policy function Is
A˜
satisfies the equilibrium condition (v) if and only if it
solves the separation problem
max
Is∈{0,1}
{Is[WA˜(s, y, z) + λnhRA˜(WA˜(s, y, z), s, y, z)]
+ (1− Is)[UA˜(s, y, z) + λuh,A˜RA˜(UA˜(s, y, z), s, y, z)]}
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We can rewrite the employment decision Is
A˜
(s, ψ) as
Is
A˜
(s, ψ) =

1, if WA˜(s, y, z) + λ
n
hRA˜(WA˜(s, y, z), s, y, z)
> UA˜(s, y, z) + λ
u
h,A˜
RA˜(UA˜(s, y, z), s, y, z),
0, otherwise
The objective function in (A.5) depends only on the workers’ skill and productivity shocks,
where Is
A˜
(s, ψ) = Is
A˜
(s, y, z). Similarly, it’s easy to show that the policy functions for re-
turning to school for unemployed workers (Iu
A˜
(s, ψ)) and employed workers (Ie
A˜
(µ, s, z¯, ψ))
depend only on ψ via y and z.
The schooling value function WA˜−1 satisfies the equilibrium condition (v) if and only
if
WA˜−1(s, ψ) =b
s
k − ch + βEψˆ|ψ max
Is∈{0,1}
{Is[WA˜(sˆ, yˆ, zˆ) + λnhRA˜(WA˜(sˆ, yˆ, zˆ), sˆ, yˆ, zˆ)]
+ (1− Is)[UA˜(sˆ, yˆ, zˆ) + λuh,A˜RA˜(UA˜(sˆ, yˆ, zˆ), sˆ, yˆ, zˆ)]}
Note that WA˜−1 does not depend on the aggregate state of the economy ψ, except for
the aggregate shocks. Using backward induction, the remaining equilibrium value and
policy functions for students and policy functions for returning to school depend only on
the aggregate state of the economy ψ via the productivity shocks y and z, for all ages below
the maximum schooling age A˜ (a ∈ {A˜, A˜− 1, ..., 1}) . Hence, an equilibrium exists, and
it is block recursive.
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